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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORT LAW AND 
INSURANCE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
Richard Lewis1 
I. The Influence of Insurance on the Tort System in General 
1 There is no doubt that insurance profoundly influences the practical operation 
of the law of tort. Liability insurance is not merely an ancillary device to pro-
tect the insured, but is the “primary medium for the payment of compensation, 
and tort law [is] a subsidiary part of the process.”2 Although the majority of 
defendants in tort are individual people, they are almost all insured. In nine 
out of ten cases the real defendants are insurance companies, with the remain-
der comprising large self-insured organisations or public bodies. Only rarely 
are individuals the real defendants. Instead policyholders cede control over 
their case to their insurer and thereafter usually play little or no part in the liti-
gation process.3 (Question 24)  Insurers determine how the claim is to proceed 
and, for example, commonly make admissions without the consent of the in-
sured,4 and settle cases in spite of the policyholder’s objection.5 
2 Insurers pay out 94 per cent of tort compensation.6 Classic studies reveal that 
it is their bureaucracy that dictates much litigation procedure, and determines 
when, and for how much, claims are settled.7 It is their buildings, rather than 
 
1 Cardiff Law School, Cardiff University, PO Box 427, Cardiff CF10 3XJ, Wales, UK. 
E-Mail: LewisRK@cardiff.ac.uk. I am indebted to the members of the European Centre 
of Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL) and to a number of insurance representatives for 
their contributions to a conference on this subject held in Munich in June 2004 at the of-
fices of the reinsurers, Munich Re. I am also grateful for the comments of my colleagues 
Richard Moorhead and Antonia Layard, and to Harold Luntz, Malcom Clarke, and Chris 
Parsons. 
2 P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (6th edn. 1999), 191. 
3 Harry Street admitted that he was once a defendant in a case but only discovered that it 
had been determined on appeal when he read about it in a newspaper! D.W. Elliott/H. 
Street, Road Accidents (1968), 209. 
4 T. Goriely/R. Moorhead/P. Abrams, More Civil Justice? The Impact of the Woolf Re-
forms on Pre-Action Behaviour (2002), 90. 
5 However, this very wide discretion given to insurers to conduct the litigation behind the 
insured’s back is subject to some limit as recognised in Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 KB 
194. 
6 Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Inju-
ry (The Pearson Commission) (1978), Cmnd 7054, vol. 2 para. 509. 
7 See H. Genn, Hard Bargaining (1987), D. Harris et al, Compensation for Illness and In-
jury (1984) and, in the USA context, H. L. Ross, Settled out of Court (1980). The major 
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courts of law, or even solicitors’ offices,8 that are the important centres of tort 
practice. The number of such centres has declined recently because of compa-
ny mergers and greater specialisation which has concentrated the work in par-
ticular areas. Consolidation in the liability market9 has resulted in it being 
dominated by only eight major companies, although there are more than fifty 
other smaller firms issuing policies. All insurers have developed highly sys-
tematised approaches to claims handling, and make extensive use of infor-
mation technology. They have increasingly structured their business, and 
closely monitor the performance of their claims handlers and lawyers. They 
have reduced the number of solicitors’ firms that act for them. Their standard 
procedures have been further refined, especially for smaller claims and “fast 
track” cases. Economic pressures mean that communication between the par-
ties takes place on the telephone rather than via letters or face to face meet-
ings, and the outcome of a claim is likely to be influenced as much by a com-
puterised assessment as by the discretion of the claims handler involved.10 
Although these generalisations do not apply to all insurers in every type of 
case,11 they have a great effect upon the way in which tort rules are viewed 
and used in practice. 
3 Because insurers dominate the system, it is very difficult to view any tort case 
in isolation: each and every case is affected, no matter whether determined in 
court or out of it. Insurers’ control over the litigation process has not been 
emphasised sufficiently when the effect of insurance upon individual cases 
and on tort rules has been considered. However, it is dealt with immediately 
here in order to place in a wider institutional framework the cases used as ex-
amples later in this report. 
4 Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system: they process the routine pay-
ments and they decide which elements of damage they will accept or contest. 
 
findings are supported by the few, more recent, empirical studies and, in particular, by 
Goriely et al. (supra fn. 4). But see the critique of Genn, in: Dingwall et al., Firm Han-
dling: The Litigation Strategies of Defence Lawyers in Personal Injury Cases, [2000] 20 
Legal Studies, 1. 
8 Lord Phillips, the Master of the Rolls, has even suggested that solicitors might no longer 
be involved with small claims where defendants are insured, and that insurers be left to 
administer these claims alone: Insurers should run small claims, [2004] Law Society Ga-
zette, 29 April. 
9 Office of Fair Trading, An Analysis of Current Problems in the UK Liability Insurance 
Market (OFT659a, 2003), para. 5.6. In 2002 although there were over 350 companies 
authorised to transact motor insurance, only 65 companies and 11 Lloyds syndicates ac-
tively did so. The ten largest motor insurers controlled two thirds of the market. ABI Re-
sponse to the Greenaway Review of Compulsory Motor Insurance and Uninsured Driv-
ing (2004), annex B. 
10 Goriely et al. (supra fn. 4), 31 and 149. 
11 Dingwall et al. (supra fn. 7). 
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It is unusual for them to contest liability12 and, as a result, they make at least 
some payment in 86 per cent of personal injury claims made against them.13 
In the great majority of cases they pay not only compensation to claimants, 
but also the litigation costs of both sides. However, if an action fails the 
claimant may become liable for costs. To avoid this, loss insurers now offer 
claimants, after they have been injured, a policy which promises to pay their 
costs in the event of an unsuccessful claim. If the claim proves successful, the 
premium can even be added to the damages awarded in tort. Insurers may also 
offer legal expenses insurance in other contexts,14 and this can affect key as-
pects of the litigation.15 In particular, claimants cannot easily choose their own 
lawyer and may be required to use one from a panel approved by the insurer.16 
The clients of these solicitors may receive a different service from those freely 
chosen by claimants, and conflicts of interest may arise.17 Insurers thus fund 
the tort system, control much of the representation, and can have an interest in 
whatever the outcome of a claim. 
5 Insurers determine the extent that lawyers become involved in disputes, and 
the tactics that are used in the proceedings. Increasingly cases are being set-
tled at an early stage, and without resort to the issue of court documents.18 In-
surers decide, in particular, whether a case merits the very exceptional treat-
 
12 Goriely et al. (supra fn. 4), 103 found that insurers’ files “contained remarkably little 
discussion of liability,” finding it initially denied in only 20 per cent of cases. 
13 Report of the Pearson Commission (supra fn. 6), vol. 2 para. 511. The relative im-
portance to the tort system of road and industrial injuries for which insurers are most 
likely to be responsible has hardly changed since the Commission reported. Based on 
more recent data, Marshall and Morris suggest that 89 per cent of motor cases and 77 per 
cent of employers liability cases were successful in 2002-03. Resolving a Burning Fees 
Issue (2003) 23 Litigation Funding 12. 
14 It is estimated that around 17 million motor policies and 15 million household policies 
offer “'Before the Event” Legal Expenses Insurance. Such insurers already control the 
litigation in 80 per cent of motor accident claims, and their market penetration is ex-
pected to continue to increase. P. Smith, Panel Solicitors: the Legal Expense Insurer's 
Perspective, [2004] 14 (3) PI Focus, 17. 
15 P. Fenn/A. Gray/N. Rickman, The Impact of Sources of Finance on Personal Injury Liti-
gation (2002) Lord Chancellor’s Department No. 7/02. P. Abrams, In Safe Hands? 
Funding Litigation by Legal Expenses Insurance (2002). 
16 H. Blundell, Free to Choose? BTE Legal Expenses Insurance and Freedom of Choice, 
[2004] Journal of Personal Injury Law, 93. It is feared that all road accident litigation 
will be dealt with by no more than a hundred solicitors firms nationwide. S. Lawson, 
BTE Insurance - a Threat to the Profession or New Opportunities?, [2004] 14 (3) PI Fo-
cus, 17. 
17 Abrams (supra fn. 15), chap. 8 and 9. 
18 Goriely et al. (supra fn. 4), 159 found that almost all parties agreed that, after the Woolf 
reforms of civil procedure, cases were now more likely to be resolved without court in-
volvement. Major insurers estimated that, because of earlier settlement, the number of 
cases disposed of only after the issue of formal proceedings had declined by a third. 
Even in the past, according to the Pearson Commission (supra fn. 6), vol. 2, table 12, 86 
per cent of cases were settled without a writ being issued.  
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ment of being taken to a court hearing.19 In effect, they allow trial judges to 
determine only one per cent of all the claims made. Only a few of these are 
appealed with the result that the senior judiciary are left to adjudicate upon a 
small fraction of what are, by then, very untypical cases. Whether an appeal 
court is to be given an opportunity to examine a point of tort law may depend 
upon the insurer for, if it serves the insurer’s purpose for doubt to remain, the 
claimant can be paid in full and threatened with a costs award if the action is 
continued.20 In this sense tort principles themselves have been shaped by and 
for insurers, even though there has been a significant growth in the power of 
claimant lawyers in the last twenty years.21 
6 Insurers’ influence upon settlements is even more pronounced than it is upon 
decided cases. For the lawyer asked by his client to advise on the merits of a 
claim it is the realities of the litigation system that are of concern rather than 
the formal rules of law. Practitioners would agree with the key analysis of 
Ross22 that the textbook rules of tort are often transformed when they come to 
be used in the system in three ways: firstly, they are simplified; secondly, they 
are made more liberal; and thirdly, they are made more inequitable. Simplifi-
cation occurs because the rules are too uncertain when applied to the individ-
ual facts of particular accidents. For reasons of cost and administrative effi-
 
19 Before being set down for trial 98 per cent of cases are settled, and many more are con-
cluded before any hearing takes place. The Pearson Commission (supra fn. 6), vol. 2, ta-
ble 12. Similarly P. Pleasence, Personal Injury Litigation in Practice (1998), 12 reveals 
that only 5 out of the 762 “ordinary” cases with costs of less than £5,000 that were stud-
ied went to trial. Earlier, Harris et al. (supra fn. 7) had suggested that the figure might be 
as high as 3 per cent. However, even in cases involving very substantial awards of dam-
ages - £150,000 or more paid by insurers in 1987 and 1988 - only ten per cent of pay-
ments were the result of formal court orders, and most of these related to children or pa-
tients for whom court approval of their settlements is required. P. Cornes, Coping with 
Catastrophic Injury (1993), 20. 
20 As recognised in Davis v Johnson [1979] AC 264 at 278. But see the failed attempt to 
prevent the House of Lords considering important causation issues in relation to asbestos 
liability in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 1 AC 32 discussed by K. 
Oliphant in: H. Koziol/B.C. Steininger (eds), European Tort Law 2002 (2003), 148, and 
in [2002] 12 (3) Association of Personal Injury Lawyers Newsletter, 19. 
21 Claimant lawyers are now much more likely to be specialists and work in larger and 
much better organised firms than in the past. Relying upon Law Society figures, Goriely 
et al. (supra fn. 4), note 4 at 25 note that even before April 2000 (when almost all legal 
aid was abolished for personal injury claims) solicitors were becoming increasingly spe-
cialised, and fewer firms were “dabbling” in such work. The founding of the Association 
of Personal Injury Lawyers in 1990 and its subsequent activity reflects the increasing 
abilities and resources of claimant lawyers. Melville-Williams, A. P. I. L., [1991] 19 
Civil Justice Quarterly, 103. The Association now has over 5,200 members, employs 28 
people, and has a turnover of £1.95 million. It is extremely well organised, and has its 
own Press, Parliamentary and Research officers as well as other administrators. See 
APIL, Annual Report and Accounts 2004. 
22 H.L. Ross, Settled out of Court (1980). 
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ciency, insurers have been forced to substitute other criteria for the strict tort 
rules. Mechanical rules of thumb - such as the car running into the back of an-
other always being found the one at fault - replace any detailed investigation 
into blame. There is neither the time nor resources to instruct experts to ana-
lyse the scene of each road accident and precisely measure its effect upon the 
individual claimant. Cases are disposed of on the basis of paperwork alone, 
and this may bear only a limited relationship with what actually occurred. The 
result of the cost pressures upon insurers is that more claims succeed than the 
strict rules of tort would allow. Many insurers pay something for claims 
which, on full investigation, would be without foundation. As a result: 
“… wherever there is insurance there is … a closer approximation to the 
objectives of social insurance in fact than the doctrines of tort law would 
lead one to suppose.”23 
7 However, this liberality is but part of a system which overall is weighted in 
favour of insurers and results in much inequality. Indeed the case often used 
to illustrate the general inequalities in the legal system involves a “one-
shotter” accident victim suing a “repeat player” insurer.24 Delay, uncertainty, 
financial need and other pressures cause claimants to accept sums much lower 
than a judge would award. The eagerness of claimants and their solicitors to 
get something from the system is reflected in the fact that they have been 
found to be very keen to accept any formal offer made to them by the “risk 
neutral” insurer.25 Those who can withstand the pressures of litigation do bet-
ter than those who cannot, with the result that those from a particular class or 
background are more likely to succeed.26 Those who suffer most are the se-
verely injured. Although in the greatest need, they will find their high value 
claim scrutinised in detail and processed very differently from the average 
case which typically involves but a minor upset and little, if any, financial 
loss. Those seriously injured are much less likely to receive “full” compensa-
tion than those suffering minor injuries who, for a variety of reasons, are like-
ly to be over-compensated.27 The overall result of the settlement system is that 
 
23 F.V. Harper/Fleming James, The Law of Torts (1956), s 13.7. 
24 The seminal article is M. Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead, [1974] 9 Law 
and Society Review, 95. However, Dingwall et al. (supra fn. 11) emphasise that not all 
defendants in personal injury cases are “repeat players” and they should not be treated as 
a homogenous group. Other limits of the article were examined in an anniversary special 
issue in [1999] 33 Law and Society Review, 795. 
25 According to D. Harris et al. (supra fn. 19), table 3.3 claimants’ solicitors used to accept 
the first formal offer made to them in two out of three cases. More recently Goriely et al. 
(supra fn. 4), 154 found more incidence of bargaining, although a third of cases still set-
tled after only one offer, almost two thirds after two and ninety per cent after three.  
26 Ross (supra fn. 22). 
27 P.A. Bell/J. O’Connell, Accidental Justice: The Dilemmas of Tort Law (1997), 63-66. D. 
Dewees/D. Duff/M. Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the 
Facts Seriously (1996), 19. 
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rough and ready justice is dispensed, much influenced by insurance company 
personnel and procedures, and driven by the needs of the insurance industry. 
The system produces arbitrary results and bears only a limited relationship to 
the portrayal of justice contained in the traditional tort textbook. 
8 The importance of insurers to the tort system is reflected in the fact that the 
claims which are brought closely match the areas where liability insurance is 
to be found. Thus road and work accidents predominate partly because they 
are the two major areas where tort insurance is compulsory. They constitute 
86 per cent of all the claims brought for personal injury.28 They dominate the 
practice of tort even though they are relatively minor causes of disability and 
incapacity for work.29 Those suffering injury in areas not covered by insur-
ance are extremely unlikely to obtain compensation. According to one study, 
whereas 1 in 4 road accident victims and 1 in 10 work accident victims gain 
compensation from tort, only 1 in 67 injured elsewhere do so.30 
9 The scope of the tort system is affected not only by those areas where liability 
insurance has been made compulsory, but also by the existence of alternative 
sources of compensation. What opportunities are there for resort to either wel-
fare payments from public insurance, or policy monies from first party private 
insurance? The interrelationship of compensation systems cannot be discussed 
in detail here,31 but a couple of examples will suffice to demonstrate the po-
tential effects of other insurance systems upon tort. The first example is a his-
torical one, and in practice resulted in the abandonment of tort law for the 
 
28 Compensation Recovery Unit figures for 2003-04, with motor comprising 48 per cent of 
the total and employer liability 37 per cent. Similarly Datamonitor, UK Personal Injury 
Litigation 2003 fig 5. The nature of litigation in this respect has hardly changed for the 
Pearson Commission total figure of 88 per cent was only 2 per cent more than that re-
ported twenty five years later. Op cit vol. 2 table 11. Atiyah suspected that the relative 
proportion of claims had not changed. P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (1997), 99. 
29 Harris (supra fn. 19), table 2.1 found that the most common accidents were those in the 
home, or suffered in the course of leisure activities or in playing sport, and yet very few 
of these resulted in any damages award. Although work and transport injuries dominate 
the tort system they comprise only about half of all accidents according to Pearson (su-
pra fn. 6), vol. 2, table 57. Datamonitor (supra fn. 28), 79 estimate that there were 7.8 
million accidents in the home in 1999 of which only 0.5 per cent potentially could result 
in a successful tort claim. 
30 The Pearson Commission (supra fn. 6), vol. 1, table 5. The study reveals that only 6.5 
per cent of all accident victims incapacitated for three days of more are compensated by 
the tort system. However, if only serious injuries are considered tort becomes much 
more important. Where an accident causes incapacity for work for six months or more, 
almost a third of claimants receive tort damages. Harris et al (supra fn. 19) made similar 
findings concerning the limited importance of the tort system. Its significance is reduced 
tenfold if account is taken of those suffering disablement not from accidents alone but 
from all causes, including illness and disease. 
31 For a recent example see U. Magnus (ed), The Impact of Social Security Law on Tort 
Law (2003). 
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great majority of work injuries. It derives from the “election” rule whereby 
workers injured in the course of their employment had to choose either to sue 
in tort or to claim private insurance benefits on a no-fault basis from their em-
ployer. They could not obtain both damages in tort and these insurance bene-
fits. For a variety of reasons employees overwhelmingly opted, or were 
pressed into receiving the no-fault benefits,32 leaving the tort system with a 
very limited role to play in the industrial field.33 Although this “employer 
privilege” continues in North America, a few European countries, and increas-
ingly in Australia, it was abolished in the UK in 1948. Tort claims for work 
accidents have since flourished, and now constitute over a third of all the ac-
tions brought.34 
10 A second example of the influence of insurance upon the extent to which 
resort is had to litigation involves private agreements between insurers to 
abandon the tort system in respect of certain losses. This may take various 
forms,35 but the agreement which has come to public attention is the so called 
“knock for knock” arrangement in relation to motor accidents. Although more 
reluctant to do so in recent years, motor insurers have set up a series of 
agreements with other insurers which have similar risk profiles concerning the 
extent to which they will litigate. In advance of any accident involving claim-
ants covered by both first and third party insurance, they agree firstly, that 
each will indemnify the property damage suffered by its own policyholder; 
and secondly, that they will not use the tort system to reclaim any of this loss 
from the other party even if they were clearly responsible for the damage. 
Where an insurer suffers a loss as a result of this arrangement, it hopes to 
make up for it in a later case. Overall, insurers expect that matters will even 
themselves out. These agreements are made in order to avoid the excessive 
cost and uncertainty that would be involved if insurers were forced to use the 
tort system for all small claims. They result from the inter-relationship of first 
party insurance with the tort system. 
11 This influence of insurance upon the general pattern of tort liability is 
matched by its effect upon the level of compensation awarded. The principles 
upon which damages are assessed implicitly recognise that it is a company 
with a deep pocket that will pay and not an individual. Although most awards 
in tort are for very limited sums - little more than £2,500 36 - there are very 
 
32 W.A. Dinsdale, History of Accident Insurance in Great Britain (1954), 161. For judicial 
criticism of the “deplorable” and “extremely shabby” tactics used by insurers see Deane 
v H. F. Edwards & Co (1941) 34 BWCC 183. 
33 P.W.J. Bartrip, Workmen’s Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain (1987), chap. 10. 
34 Compensation Recovery Unit figures for 2003-4. Contrast the somewhat lower propor-
tion cited by Datamonitor, UK Personal Injury Litigation 2003, fig 5.  
35 R. Lewis, Insurers’ Agreements not to Enforce their Strict Legal Rights, [1985] 48 Mod-
ern Law Review, 275. 
36 This is the median figure in the survey of 81,000 cases receiving legal aid and closed in 
1996 - 97 in P. Pleasence, Personal Injury Litigation in Practice (1998), 40 fig 3.17. In 
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few individuals who could afford to pay the amounts required in serious inju-
ry cases. The justice of the case never merits an investigation into the limited 
means of the average person found liable because that person will not have to 
pay. If it were not for insurance there would be little hope of restoring the 
claimant to the pre-accident position in a serious injury case. It is doubtful 
whether we would even wish to attempt to place full responsibility for the 
damage on most defendants. The very nature of the tort system would have to 
change. Without insurance, it is probable that tort liability itself could not sur-
vive.37 
12 These facts about the tort system have been empirically established in a series 
of studies,38 but gain little prominence in tort textbooks.39 (Question 8) In 
spite of students being left in ignorance, it cannot be denied that insurance in 
this context is fundamental to the general operation of the tort system. Over 
fifty years ago one writer concluded that the doctrines of tort law 
“… are horse and buggy rules in an age of machinery; and they might 
well have gone to the scrap heap some time ago had not the tremendous 
growth of liability insurance and the progressive ingenuity of the compa-
 
70 per cent of successful cases the damages were less than £5,000, although the overall 
average was £11,000. P. Fenn/ N. Rickman, Costs of Low Value Liability Claims 1997-
2002, report average damages of only £3,000 for employers liability accident claims, 
although this study of almost 100,000 cases related only to claims for less than £15,000. 
See http://www.dca.gov.uk/majrep/claims/elclaims.htm . Datamonitor (supra fn. 28), 81 
reports the average general liability personal injury claim in 2002 cost £4,407. In evi-
dence to the Law Commission in 1993 the Trades Union Council noted that the average 
sum obtained in the 150,000 union-backed cases in 1991 was under £2,000. 
37 J.G. Fleming, The American Tort Process (1988), 21. Without insurance, the system 
“would long ago have collapsed under the weight of the demands put on it and been re-
placed by an alternative, and perhaps more efficient system of accident compensation.” 
J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th edn. 1998), 13. 
38 Extensively referenced in Dewees et al. (supra fn. 27). But see Saks, Do We Really 
Know Anything about the Behaviour of the Tort Litigation System – and Why Not?, 
[1992] 140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register, 1147. 
39 The major exception being P. Cane (supra fn. 2), especially chap. 9. There is little useful 
discussion in the many student and practitioner texts with the exception of M. Jones, 
Textbook on Torts (8th edn. 2002), s.1.3 and S. Deakin/A. Johnson/B. Markesinis, Tort 
Law (5th edn. 2003). J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th edn. 1998), 13 regards insur-
ance as the cause of a vast expansion in liability and this “pervasive trend runs like a 
golden thread” throughout the book. There are few insurance textbooks compared to tort, 
but they similarly avoid examination of the effect of insurance on tort liability. A notable 
exception is the excellent section in M.A. Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of Insurance 
(1997), chap. 8. 
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nies made it possible to get some of the benefits of social insurance un-
der - or perhaps in spite of - the legal rules.”40 
13 Although insurance has had this profound effect upon the tort system, there 
remains much doubt about, firstly, whether the presence or absence of insur-
ance in a particular claim has an effect upon liability in that case; and, second-
ly, the extent to which the rules of tort themselves have been revised to take 
account of the distributive effect of insurance. These are matters discussed in 
later sections of this report. 
II. The Areas Of Compulsory Insurance (Questions 2-4) 
14 In the UK the two most important areas where it is compulsory for there to be 
liability insurance are well known and not dealt with in detail here even 
though they provide the focus for much tort litigation.41 There must be insur-
ance against liability incurred, firstly, by those using a motor vehicle in a pub-
lic place; and secondly, by an employer for injury to his employees in the 
course of their employment.42 These two areas of liability are of vital im-
portance to the tort system for, as stated above, they comprise almost 9 out of 
10 claims made for personal injury. The incidence of tort liability thus closely 
mirrors the areas of compulsory insurance.  
15 The other areas of compulsory insurance are relatively minor in respect of 
personal injury, but are significant with regard to protection against economic 
loss. (Question 2) However, these miscellaneous instances of compulsory in-
surance reveal a lack of coherent legislative policy with regard to the need for 
such protection, at least in relation to personal injury. It is difficult to discern 
why insurance should be required in respect of certain accidents but not oth-
ers. The ad hoc introduction of compulsion into the occasional statute has tak-
en place without discussion of the potential problems caused by the lack of 
cover in related areas. The anomalies that result can be illustrated by the fact 
that insurance is required for injury caused by horses and wild animals, but 
not for more common injuries caused by bicycles or dogs; it is required for 
cars and aircraft, but not for boats or trains; it is required of employers with 
regard to claims from their employees but not from members of the public; 
 
40 J. Fleming, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, [1948] 
57 Yale Law Journal (Yale L J) 549, at 569. 
41 C. Parsons, Employers Liability Insurance - How Secure is the System?, [1999] 28 In-
dustrial Law Journal, 109. 
42 Road Traffic Act 1988 ss 143 and 145, and the Employers Liability (Compulsory Insur-
ance) Act 1969 and the relevant regulations (SI 1998 No 2573). Since 1999 employers 
have been required to secure cover for up to £5 million in respect of any one occurrence, 
but in practice most insurers buy cover in the £10 to £50 million range. For a motor ve-
hicle, as an alternative to insurance, by s 144 of the 1988 Act it is possible to deposit 
£500,000 with the Supreme Court. Some public bodies are also exempt from the re-
quirement to insure. 
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and it applies to nuclear reactors, but not to those using explosives or engaged 
in other activities which are exceptionally hazardous. Finally it is required for 
causing oil pollution at sea, but not for causing it on land. The full list is as 
follows: 
 Owners of horse riding establishments are required to insure against liability 
for injuries resulting from the hire or use of their horses.43 
 A keeper of a dangerous wild animal can only do so under licence, a condition 
of which is that there is insurance against liability for any damage caused by 
the animal.44 
 Aircraft operators are required to hold liability insurance as a condition of 
obtaining their licence.45 
 A licensee of a nuclear reactor is strictly liable for all damage caused and must 
carry liability insurance or make otherwise suitable provision for compensa-
tion claims.46 
 Owners of ships carrying more than 2000 tons of oil and entering or leaving a 
UK port must be insured against liability.47 The relevant legislation also makes 
provision for the implementation of an international convention48 which will 
extend the duty to insure to owners of all ships carrying any of 6000 defined 
substances, including oil and gas. When the provisions come into force the lia-
bility will be strict.49 The possibility of compulsory insurance for a broad 
range of environmental damage is also envisaged in a draft European Di-
rective.50 
 
43 Riding Establishments Act 1970 s. 1 (4A) (d). 
44 Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 s 1(6) (iv). 
45 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act 1960 and the relevant regulations SI 1964 No 1116. 
46 Nuclear Installations Act 1965 s 19. 
47 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s 163, and the Oil Pollution (Compulsory Insurance) Regs 
1997 No 1820. In 2002 the UK also signed the International Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Pollution Damage Caused by Bunker Oil adopted by the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) in 2001. The UK acted in support of the Convention’s aims of en-
suring all sources of marine pollution are covered by international strict liability and 
compulsory insurance regimes. 
48 The Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention adopted by the IMO in May 1996. 
49 Little, [1998] Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quaterly, 554. 
50 Art. 14 para. 2 of the draft European Directive on Environmental Liability states that, af-
ter a review of the financial security provisions, proposals may be submitted for manda-
tory financial security. Compulsory insurance may then be required. 
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 Insurance may also be required for a ship in UK waters in respect of a wider 
range of liabilities than those relating to the environment as discussed above.51 
 Solicitors are required to insure against their professional liabilities.52 Alt-
hough there is no legislation forcing accountants or barristers to insure, their 
professional associations require them to do so. 
 Because the National Health Service indemnifies them for their work in the 
public service, neither doctors nor dentists are required to insure in such cir-
cumstances. However, when working as independent contractors they are not 
protected by the NHS and, although required by their professional associations 
to insure, there is no statutory requirement for them to do so. Even though the 
Secretary of State for Health can require doctors and dentists to insure,53 this 
power has not been exercised. A Bill requiring these professionals to arrange 
an indemnity against liability failed to pass its Parliamentary stages in 2003.54 
In contrast, certain other medical professionals are required by statute to in-
sure.55 
 Independent financial advisers have been required to carry liability insurance 
by the industry regulator.56 Insurance intermediaries were formerly required to 
insure against liability57 and will shortly have a similar obligation when the In-
surance Mediation Directive is implemented.58 
 Although legislation has been passed requiring estate agents to insure against 
liability for failing to account for clients’ money, it has never been brought in-
to force.59 
 Related measures have been taken to protect the public against the insolvency 
of others having control over clients’ money, but these have not always in-
volved requiring insurance against tort liability as such. Bonds, insurance, or 
 
51 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s 192A, as inserted by s 16 of the Merchant Shipping And 
Maritime Security Act 1997. 
52 Solicitors Act 1974 s 37, and the Solicitors Indemnity Insurance Rules 2002. 
53 The Health Act 1999 s 9.  
54 The Medical Practitioners and Dentists (Professional Negligence Insurance) Bill 2003. 
55 For example, the Osteopaths Act 1993 and the Chiropractors Act 1994.  
56 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s 138. Investment Firms: Proposed Policy and 
Rules (2003) at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp193.pdf. 
57 Under the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977 s 12. 
58 For the proposed changes see FSA Consultation paper P193: Professional Indemnity In-
surance for Personal Investment Firms: Proposed Policy and Rules (2003) at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp193.pdf. 
59 Estate Agents Act 1979 s 16. 
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industry levies as security against insolvency, rather than liability, may be re-
quired, for example, of banks60 and travel agents.61 
A.  Voluntary insurance 
16 Although, as discussed below, some do not insure in spite of being required 
by law to do so, it is also the case that many take out liability insurance even 
though they do not have to do so. For example, businesses usually carry pub-
lic liability insurance to complement and extend their compulsory employers’ 
coverage by including such risks as liability arising from their occupation of 
property. They may also voluntarily insure against specific risks that are usu-
ally excluded from general liability policies (such as those deriving from lia-
bility as manufacturers of products, or from liability arising from environmen-
tal and pollution control regulations). In addition, directors and officers’ lia-
bility insurance may be purchased as a protection against managerial incom-
petence. 
17 Ordinary individuals similarly will agree to take out liability insurance beyond 
the scope of the compulsory cover. Often they will be unaware of the extent to 
which they are protected because the purchase of liability insurance is not the 
main purpose of the transaction. For example, certain liabilities can be indem-
nified merely as a consequence of a policy taken out in order to obtain a 
mortgage on property or to protect payment for a holiday. Purchasers may be 
surprised to discover that they are protected against their liability for injuries 
on their property or resulting from their negligence on holiday. Again, those 
taking out loss insurance against the contents of their home being damaged 
may find, on reading their policy, that they are also covered for their liability 
to others in many circumstances. However, there are no statutes which force 
people to take out these different forms of liability insurance. 
18 It is impossible to estimate the percentage of the population protected as po-
tential claimants by liability insurance. (Question 4) It varies according to the 
cause of the injury and the type of loss suffered. In any event it must be re-
membered that strictly it is the defendant that is protected by such insurance; 
the claimant can only gain access to the compensation fund if liability can be 
established. Unlike in many other European countries at least with regard to 
motor vehicles,62 liability in the UK still requires proof of fault. As a result, as 
we have already seen, only a small minority of those injured by accident or 
disease obtain compensation even in areas where liability insurance is com-
pulsory. 
 
60 Banking Act 1979. 
61 The Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992 (SI No 
3288). 
62 See B.A. Koch/H. Koziol (eds), Compensation for Personal Injury in a Comparative 
Perspective (2003). 
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B.  Failure To Arrange The Insurance Required By Statute 
19 Failure to comply with the obligation to insure is subject to sanctions in the 
criminal law, the normal penalty being a small fine.63 (Question 3) The extent 
to which there is compliance varies. Although proof of insurance may be a 
pre-requisite to obtaining the relevant licence, there may still be many who 
avoid payment. It has been estimated that about 1 in 20 motorists,64 and about 
1 in 200 employers65 do not have the insurance required. 
20 In the areas where insurance has been made compulsory further measures 
have been taken to ensure that compensation will be available despite the 
misdeeds or failings of a defendant. However, again here there are various 
anomalies in the protection given with the result that those injured on the road 
have more security than those injured at work or elsewhere.66 The state has in-
tervened to regulate the tort system either directly by legislation, or indirectly 
by forcing insurers to ensure that the claims of certain accident victims will be 
met. Thus reserve funds levied from insurers will compensate, via the Motor 
Insurers’ Bureau, if a motorist fails to comply with the obligation to insure. If 
the motorist is in breach of the terms of the insurance because, for example, 
he drove when drunk, or on business instead of pleasure, insurers are prevent-
ed from avoiding the policy with regard to the liabilities for which the driver 
must insure. There is similar, although less extensive, protection for an em-
ployee in a claim against an employer found to be in breach of a condition in 
his insurance policy. However, if an employer fails to comply with the statu-
tory duty to insure there are no reserve funds available. The injured employ-
ee’s claim may then be worthless. Finally, there is some protection for the 
 
63 New fixed penalties were announced in June 2003, but for a first offence the motoring 
fine still averages only £200. There were 267,000 convictions for such a failure to insure 
in 2001, and in over half of the cases the fine was less than £100 according to the Home 
Office, Offences Relating to Motor Vehicles in England and Wales 2001 (2003). Em-
ployers can be fined up to £2,500 a day, but in practice the fines are low and enforce-
ment more limited. 
64  D. Greenaway, Uninsured Driving in the United Kingdom (2004), Department of 
Transport,London 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_rdsafety/documents/page/dft_rdsafety_030393
.hcsp. Similar figures published by the Motor Insurers Information Centre show that 
there are over a million uninsured drivers are on the UK roads every day. 
http://www.miic.org.uk. The 5% default rate in the UK is similar to that in Spain, and is 
better than those estimated for Italy and Greece, but it is much worse than that in Ger-
many (0.1%) and the Netherlands (1%-2%) according to the Association of British In-
surers, Uninsured Driving in Europe (2004). 
65 Department of Work and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Compulsory Insur-
ance: Second Stage Report (2003). Contrast the Small Business Service telephone sur-
vey of over 2000 businesses in 2002 which suggested that the figure was 1 in 14. 
66 Parsons (supra fn. 41). 
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claimant if the tortfeasor has gone bankrupt or into liquidation.67 A direct ac-
tion against the insurer may then be allowed. 
21 The effect of failure to comply with the obligation to insure in the civil law 
differs according to whether motor or employer’s liability is being considered. 
In motor insurance, the failure gives rise to an action for breach of statutory 
duty against the person who should have taken out a policy.68 However, the 
practical effect of this is limited because the reserve funds will compensate in 
any event for injuries caused by an uninsured driver. In contrast, where the 
failure to insure is that of an employer rather than a motorist there are no re-
serve funds. A civil action for breach of statutory duty then could have practi-
cal value. However, the Court of Appeal has held that no such action can suc-
ceed with the result that a claimant was left without compensation when he 
sought damages personally from the directors of the uninsured and insolvent 
firm that had employed him.69 (Question 16) 
C.  Failure To Arrange Insurance Other Than That Required By Statute 
 (Questions 14-17) 
22 In general, although it is compulsory to insure in the areas listed above, there 
is no liability in English law for otherwise failing to take out insurance. Lia-
bility is usually established by proving fault, and it is not negligent if the only 
failure is to put in place measures to pay for losses tortiously caused. This can 
be illustrated by the position of parents and liability for their children. In the 
UK, although generally not liable for their children’s torts, in theory parents 
could be liable for their own torts in failing to control their child.70 However, 
no parent has ever been found liable for failing to take out insurance either 
against their own liability, or against that of their child. (Question 15). 
23 However, this principle that there is no general duty to insure has recently 
been qualified at least in relation to the liability of occupiers employing inde-
pendent contractors on their property. Statute prescribes that, in order to avoid 
liability for the acts of a contractor, the occupier must take steps to ensure that 
the contractor is competent to do the work in question. At least where the con-
tractor is doing hazardous work, a majority of the Court of Appeal has agreed 
that the occupier should inquire whether the contractor is covered by a liabil-
ity insurance policy because this is one of the factors which is relevant in 
 
67 Third Party (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930. The deficiencies of this Act were noted 
by the Law Commission, Third Parties - Rights against Insurers Report No 272 (2001). 
See also the European Communities (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002 (SI No 
3061) made pursuant to the Fourth Motor Insurance Directive (No 2000/26/EC).  
68 Monk v Warbey [1935] 1 KB 75. 
69 Richardson v Pitt-Stanley [1995] 1 QB 123. However, this case was not followed in 
Scotland in Quinn v McGinty [1998] Rep LR 107. 
70 See K. Oliphant, Children and the Law of Tort in England and Wales, in: ECTIL paper 
forthcoming.  
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proving competence. However, this duty to make inquiries does not extend to 
checking the terms of the policy itself or to discovering whether the policy is 
still current. As a result, on the facts of the case, the occupier was held not li-
able for a negligent fairground contractor who had recently allowed his liabil-
ity insurance policy to expire.71 Nor was a duty to check for insurance found 
where the contractor had already been approved by the local authority to carry 
out the task in question.72 
24 If a defendant fails to take out not liability insurance, but first party insurance 
which would have indemnified the claimant against loss, again there is little 
authority in tort to support a claim. There can be contractual responsibilities 
which, for example, may require one party to insure for the benefit of others 
having an interest in the property in question.73 However, outside of contract 
or trust, there is no duty to insure. This general principle was affirmed in the 
case of a school that was held not liable for failing to take out insurance for 
the possibility of its children being injured in the course of playing sport.74 
The court pointed out that there was no duty for the parent to insure the child 
and that it would therefore be inappropriate to place a more onerous duty up-
on the school. Again, in a related case, an employer was held not liable for 
failing to insure an employee against the risk of him being injured in the 
course of his employment by the fault of a third party who could not pay any 
damages himself.75 In this case the injury was suffered as a result of a road 
accident in Ethiopia. Although it is compulsory to insure against liability for 
injuries occurring in the UK, this does not extend to cover injury suffered 
abroad or where no liability can be established. There is therefore no duty to 
arrange first party insurance for another person. 
25 Just as there is no common law principle requiring defendants to take out loss 
or liability insurance, there is no formal rule to support a claimant being found 
contributory negligent merely because he failed to take out first-party insur-
ance. (Question 17) Thus a landlord who failed to insure his property was 
nevertheless able to succeed in his tort action against a tenant who negligently 
caused damage to that property.76 (Question 23) Similarly, the fact that a 
claimant has taken out first party insurance in a personal injury case is gener-
 
71 Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire NHS Trust [2003] QB 443. Even in this case one judge, 
Sedley LJ, strongly dissented from the view that there should be a duty to check for in-
surance. In Bottomley v Todmorden Cricket Club [2003] PIQR P18 although Sedley’s 
dissent was supported by the first instance judge, on appeal, further support was given to 
the idea that insurance was relevant to establishing the competence of the contractor. 
72 T Naylor v Payling [2004] EWCA 560. 
73 As illustrated recently in Scottish & Newcastle Plc v GD Construction (St Albans) Ltd 
[2003] EWCA Civ 16 and Oxford Aviation Services Ltd v Godolphin Management Co 
Ltd [2004] EWHC 232. 
74 Van Oppen v Bedford Charity Trustees [1989] 3 All ER 389. 
75 Rush v Reid & Tompkins Group [1989] 3 All ER 228. 
76 Lambert v Keymood Ltd [1999] Lloyds Rep IR 80. 
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ally ignored, and damages must be paid even though the loss has been com-
pensated from this other source.77 Formally, the claimant is thus neither penal-
ised for his prudence in arranging insurance, nor for his thoughtlessness in 
failing to insure.  
III. The Influence Of Insurance Upon Particular Cases And Rules: 
General Views 
26 In the opening section of this report we concluded that insurers have had a 
major effect upon the general operation of the tort system. However, there is 
much more doubt about the extent that insurance can be shown to be a factor 
taken into account to determine the outcome of individual cases. To what ex-
tent have facts been interpreted to fit the established basis for liability, and the 
result thus manufactured perhaps for the benefit of an uninsured claimant? 
More significant for the academic tort lawyer is the suggestion that, rather 
than the facts, it may be that the rules themselves that have been changed to 
accommodate the insurance position. 
27 Why might this be done? We need not examine the economic, political and 
social arguments in detail here. However, in simple terms, some have argued 
that liability may more readily be imposed if the tort action is seen only as a 
means of compensating needy individuals, and the defendant is merely a con-
duit to an insurance fund and a means of distributing the cost of the injury to a 
wider pool. Conversely, if the claimant has his own insurance for the loss 
caused, his needs are less and liability may then be denied. “Who is insured?” 
and “who is in the better position to insure?” have thus been seen by some as 
key questions in determining liability issues. Whether it is economically more 
efficient for a loss to be met from first party insurance rather than from liabil-
ity insurance via a tort claim raises wide issues. However, it is sufficient here 
to note that the relative insurability of the parties has been argued to be rele-
vant when determining whether liability should be imposed. 
A.  Judicial views  
28 In the past it was almost unknown for judges to examine or even acknowledge 
the existence of insurance relating to a claim, and it remains extremely unusu-
al for them to do so. They have occasionally asserted that insurance has had 
no direct effect upon them, stating that it “is not the function of a court of law 
to fasten on the fortuitous circumstance of insurance to impose a greater bur-
den” on the defendant than would otherwise be the case.78 However, their 
 
77 R. Lewis, Deducting Benefits from Damages for Personal Injury (1999), chap. 6. How-
ever, in a property damage case insurance may have some effect. See, for example, 
Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] QB 625 discussed below. 
78 Viscount Simonds in: Davie v New Merton Board Mills [1959] AC 604 at 627. Similar 
comments were made by the same judge in Lister v Romford Ice Storage Co Ltd [1957] 
AC 555 at 576, and by Lord Bridge in Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 350 at 393. Lord Wil-
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general silence about such matters has not prevented speculation about wheth-
er the wider arguments relating to insurability are having an unacknowledged 
effect. It is difficult for judges to discuss insurance factors openly because 
they give rise to wide ranging policy considerations. In addition, if insurance 
were openly recognised as a determining factor, judges could be accused of 
deciding cases on the basis of the parties’ means alone, and the idea that a rich 
or protected litigant must always lose to a poor or needy one is too simplistic 
to contemplate. 
29 As an exception to the general rule, one judge, Lord Denning, was more pre-
pared to examine the insurance background to disputes but even he did so on-
ly occasionally. Most famously, in a case over thirty years ago involving a 
learner driver being sued by her instructor for negligent driving, he suggested 
that the presence of liability insurance could determine the standard of care to 
be applied. He thought that the skill of a fully qualified driver could be re-
quired from the learner driver partly because she carried liability insurance. 
“Parliament requires every driver to be insured against third party risks. 
The reason is so that a person injured by a motor car should not be left to 
bear the loss on his own, but should be compensated out of the insurance 
fund. The fund is better able to bear it than he can. But the injured person 
is only able to recover if the driver is liable in law. So the judges see to it 
that he is liable, unless he can prove care and skill of a high standard …. 
Thus we are … moving away from the concept: ‘No liability without 
fault.’ We are beginning to apply the test: ‘On whom should the risk fall?’ 
Morally the learner driver is not at fault; but legally she is liable to be be-
cause she is insured and the risk should fall on her.”79  
30 Two years later he returned to the theme, pointing out that it was damages as 
well as liability that had been influenced: 
“The damages are expected to be borne by the insurers. The courts them-
selves recognise this every day. They would not find negligence so readi-
ly - or award sums of such increasing magnitude - except on the footing 
that the damages are to be borne, not by the man himself, but by an insur-
ance company.”80 
31 Although the law reports contain no other statements as explicit as these, in 
the last fifteen years or so they have made increasing reference to insurance. 
 
berforce in Morgans v Launchbury [1973] AC 127 at 137 thought it dangerous and irre-
sponsible for a judge to alter the basis of liability without knowledge about the impact 
upon the insurance system. 
79 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 at 699. 
80 Morris v Ford Motor Co Ltd [1973] QB 792 at 798 
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Judges are more prepared than in the past to discuss wider policy issues, 81 and 
these have sometimes included insurance aspects.82  Within this broader 
framework judges have referred to distributive justice whereby account is tak-
en of the effects of a decision beyond the immediate parties to the dispute. In 
a recent lecture Lord Steyn stated: 
“The primary aim of tort law is the pursuit of corrective justice. It re-
quires somebody who has harmed another without justification to indem-
nify the other. There is, however, another perspective, namely considera-
tions of distributive justice. It concentrates on the place of the plaintiff 
and the defendant in society…. Not surprisingly, our courts have not shut 
their eyes to such considerations: the insurance position of the parties has 
sometimes been treated as relevant.”83 
32 Insurance, therefore, may be taken into account but only occasionally. It is 
difficult to forecast when and with what effect. There is considerable uncer-
tainty. 
B.  Commentators’ views 
33 A Realist perspective upon the judicial role emphasises the importance of 
underlying policy considerations as against the formalist reasoning contained 
in the judgements themselves. Traditional judicial silence on insurance has 
provided a vacuum which a few tort scholars have sought to fill. Some have 
drawn inferences about the influence of insurance in spite the reasons express-
ly given in the judgements, whereas others have rejected such causal connec-
tions. There has been a sharp division in views. On the one hand, there are 
those who argue that the “hidden hand” of insurance has had a great effect;84 
courts are said frequently “to treat tort as a compensation and loss-spreading 
scheme, via the pervasive phenomenon of liability insurance.”85 Judges may 
 
81 K. Malleson, The New Judiciary (1999), R. Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in 
the Changing Constitution (2002), M. Kirby, Judicial Activism (2004). 
82 For an Australian context see M. Gill, The Expansion of Liability and the Role of Insur-
ance – Who’s the Chicken?, [1999] International Journal of Insurance Law, 27. 
83 Lord Steyn, Perspectives of Corrective and Distributive Justice in Tort Law, [2002] 23 
Irish Jurist, 1. Similarly, in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 at 83 he 
described the duty of care as “a mosaic in which the principles of corrective and dis-
tributive justice are interwoven.” Lord Hoffmann said that corrective justice “… has 
been abandoned in favour of a cautious pragmatism” in Frost v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455 at 502. 
84 J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th edn. 1998), 13 : “[W]hile in theory insurance fol-
lows liability, in experience insurance often paves the way to liability. In short it is the 
hidden persuader.” It plays its role “from a hidden position behind the scenery” accord-
ing to H. Cousy, Tort Liability and Liability Insurance: A Difficult Relationship, in: H. 
Koziol/B.C. Steininger (eds), European Tort Law 2001 (2002). 
85 J. Morgan, Tort, Insurance and Incoherence, [2004] 67 Modern L Rev, 384 at 392. 
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even be influenced without knowing it because insurance “acts as a stimulus 
to decision-making whether or not the decision-maker is consciously aware of 
it.”86 The result, according to Cane, is that “there can be little doubt that the 
development of the law has been influenced by the growing prevalence of lia-
bility insurance.”87 Another textbook agrees: 
“… [T]here is no denying the fact that, as a result of modern insurance 
practices, the notions of “duty” (and causation) are at times used to con-
ceal insurance dictates and the term “negligence” is employed in contexts 
where the defendant could not humanly have avoided the accident in 
question.”88  
Even if the rules themselves have not directly been affected, insurance may 
thus “invisibly” influence the result in a particular case.89 
34 On the other hand, others have argued that the effect of insurance has been 
exaggerated and that in fact it has had little effect on tort rules themselves. 
Prosser’s view, over thirty years ago, was that:  
“While liability insurance undoubtedly has had an effect, it is difficult to 
escape the impression that all this has been very much overstated. A dis-
passionate observer, if such a one is to be found in this area, might … 
conclude that the ‘impact’ of insurance upon the law of torts has been 
amazingly slight; that most of the changes that have been pointed out are 
due to other causes….”90 
Similarly, Clarke argues that influence - in the sense that the law has been tai-
lored to fit the insurance position - is scarcely to be seen at all.91 
35 In examining these issues Stapleton has written a key article.92 She argues that 
any causal link between the development of insurance and the expansion of 
tort liability must be viewed with caution. Echoing the words of Prosser, she 
concludes that when courts refer to insurance they do so only as a “make-
 
86 M. Davies, The End of the Affair: Duty of Care and Liability Insurance, [1989] 9 Legal 
Studies, 67 cf B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), 12: "It is often 
through these subconscious forces that judges are kept consistent with themselves, and 
inconsistent with one another." 
87 (Supra fn. 2), 203. 
88 S. Deakin/A. Johnson/B. Markesinis, Tort Law (5th edn. 2003), 3. 
89 J. Fleming, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, [1948] 
57 Yale L J, 549 at 551. 
90 W.L. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th edn. 1971), 547. In his evaluation of Prosser, White ar-
gues that, although insurance was not the primary factor, it did stimulate the growth of 
strict liability. G.E. White, Tort Law in America (1980), 172. 
91 M.A. Clarke (supra fn. 39), 283. 
92 Stapleton, Tort, Insurance and Ideology, [1995] 58 Modern Law Review, 820. 
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weight” factor after it has been decided to impose liability for other reasons. 
She points to tort rules which appear to be entirely unaffected by insurance 
factors, and argues that commentators have used the argument selectively to 
explain certain developments while ignoring other areas. There has been no 
fundamental shift in the formal basis of tort law such as might have been ex-
pected if insurance were to provide a new foundation for its development. The 
formal rules still usually require proof of fault, and the failure to move deci-
sively towards a stricter liability is evidence of the limited effect of insurance. 
Finally, Stapleton is concerned that if attention is paid only to insurability, the 
potential deterrent or corrective role of tort will be suppressed. Even though 
many will not share the belief that, in practice, tort has much effect in control-
ling behaviour or achieving deterrence, and many may doubt that the tort sys-
tem produces results which have such high claims to justice, nevertheless they 
will agree that it is a mistake to place too much emphasis upon tort law as a 
means of compensation. Tort is but one of a number of compensation options 
available, or which might be developed.93 
36 In spite of these criticisms Stapleton acknowledges that insurance is clearly 
relevant to “the operation of tort law in daily life.” This includes its effect up-
on who sues, and the dynamics of the settlement process. In addition, she 
agrees that judges are fully aware that it is the insurer who pays, and, at a very 
general level, it is likely that courts have been influenced. However, she casts 
doubt upon more specific claims that link the expansion of tort liability with 
the availability of liability insurance. 
37 Although there is much to agree with here,94 it is not always easy in practice 
to draw the distinctions upon which the analysis relies. In particular, it can be 
difficult to isolate individual decision making from the institutional frame-
work of the tort system. Stapleton accepts, but does not expand upon, the in-
fluence of insurance on the “operation of tort law in daily life.” This was out-
lined at the beginning of this report where it was suggested that insurers’ con-
trol and administration of the tort system affects all claims. In particular, later 
in this report it is argued that the pervasive influence of insurance becomes 
clearer if the focus changes from liability to the assessment of damages. Re-
 
93 S. Sugarman, Personal Injury and Social Policy - Institutional and Ideological Alterna-
tives, in: N. Mullany/A.M. Linden (eds.), Torts Tomorrow (1998). One such alternative 
was given in S. Sugarman, Doing away with Personal Injury Law (1989), and another in 
T. Ison, Compensation Systems for Injury and Disease: The Policy Choices (1994). 
These solutions can be contrasted with, for example, the first party insurance proposals 
of P.S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (1997), and the reform suggestions noted by 
Dewees et al. (supra fn. 27). 
94 In criticising the article, Morgan, [2004] 67 Modern Law Review, 384 does not reflect 
upon the subtleties in Stapleton’s argument contained in the previous paragraph, and ra-
ther than engaging with the detailed analysis of the caselaw she presents, relies upon on-
ly two recent cases to substantiate his argument that courts “frequently” take insurance 
into account. Unfortunately, this is the very generalisation to which Stapleton objects. 
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storing the victim to his pre-accident position becomes inconceivable in seri-
ous injury cases in the absence of a mechanism for distributing the cost of do-
ing so. In this sense each award of substantial damages reflects the importance 
of insurance to the tort system. Finally, even if we accept that tort rules them-
selves have not been changed substantially by insurance we might still con-
clude that, in determining the facts of a particular case, judges have been “in-
visibly” affected by knowledge of the insurance position. The “sympathetic 
factor” at trial is known to litigators, and is what Clarke calls the “magnetic 
effect” of money whereby the result is influenced by any deep pocket in a 
case.95 Fitting the facts, rather than the law, to the insurance position limits the 
value of Stapleton’s analysis. 
C.  Conclusion 
38 All commentators therefore agree that insurance undoubtedly has had some 
influence upon tort; it is only the extent of this influence that is open to ques-
tion. Here it is argued that that influence has been substantial. Not only has in-
surance had a profound effect upon the operation of the claims system in gen-
eral, but it has also influenced individual cases. Practitioners are aware that 
insurance is one of the factors that may determine the inferences to be drawn 
from the facts of the case. It competes with the moral basis of the fault princi-
ple in this regard. Sometimes the insurance factor and the need for compensa-
tion will triumph, and negligence will be found where none existed; but occa-
sionally the absence of fault will prevent the claim from succeeding. The mo-
rality of the fault principle still has a great effect upon determining liability, 
but the general effect of insurance becomes more pronounced when damages 
for serious injury are being assessed. 
39 Whether the rules of tort themselves have been changed to reflect insurance is 
more difficult to establish. On the one hand, it is certainly true that the foun-
dations of tort remain largely unchanged. Formally, liability still depends up-
on proof of fault and, even where rules have been revised more in favour of 
claimants, it is too easy to suggest that insurance is the cause. On the other 
hand, some judges have acknowledged that they have concerned themselves 
with who has the deeper pocket, or who was in the better position to distrib-
ute, or absorb, a loss. It is difficult to conclude that loss distribution arguments 
have influenced only the facts found and not, to some degree, the rules ap-
plied. However, substantial change in tort rules has not occurred. Instead it is 
the overall involvement of insurers with the system which leads us to con-
clude that insurance has had a major effect. 
 
95 (Supra fn. 39), 273. 
22 Richard Lewis 
D.  Ought Insurance to Have Influence?  
40 Discussion of whether liability rules and the tort system in general have been 
influenced by insurance must be distinguished from whether rules should be 
so influenced. As soon as we start discussing law reform, we cannot focus on-
ly upon the distributive effects between the class of victims and the class of 
wrongdoers. Instead we must also take account of the majority of injured peo-
ple who are presently left completely outside of the tort system. Whether, for 
all these people, compensation is better paid via tort liability as opposed to 
first party loss insurance or state welfare payments depends upon the political, 
moral and economic prisms through which the question is viewed. “Should 
the state play a greater role in dealing with misfortune?” invites a wide range 
of responses. The extent that tort system should be seen as only providing cor-
rective and not distributive justice reflects wider political and moral perspec-
tives.96 
41 Even within a narrower focus, the argument that the reality of insurance and 
insurability should be taken into account is a very imprecise one. Whose in-
surability should we focus upon? By what criteria are we to determine who is 
the “better” or cheaper insurer when both sides will nearly always be able to 
purchase cover at some price? By concentrating on insurability we may divert 
attention from deterrence and whether market forces may have a role to play 
via tort in affecting risk taking behaviour, although the scope for such a possi-
bility has been much exaggerated often because of its very failure to take into 
account how insurance actually operates. Description of the influence that in-
surance has had must therefore be distinguished from the prescriptive effect 
that others might wish it to have. In contrast to the conclusion we reached 
above that insurance has had a major influence upon the tort system, and has 
had at least some part to play upon individual decision making, the view here 
is that it will not be possible to reach any general agreement on the role that it 
ought to play. 
IV. The Influence of Insurance upon Particular Cases and Rules: 
Analysis Of Specific Areas 
A.  Procedure (Question 24) 
42 Insurers are closely consulted and involved in making rules of civil procedure. 
These rules permeate the tort system and bring it to life. The Civil Procedure 
Rules 1998, eight pre-action protocols,97 and fixed costs agreements98 were 
 
96 For a website debate revealing the divisions among tort scholars see the 2003 postings 
beginning with Harold Luntz at http://www.ucc.ie/law/odg/messages/030723b.htm. 
97 http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/menus/protocol.htm. 
98 These agreements were reached following mediation by the Civil Justice Council be-
tween what were described as the two sides of the personal injury litigation industry. 
The Civil Procedure Rules were subsequently amended to reflect the agreements. 
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the result of lengthy negotiation between interested parties, and insurers 
played a major part. In particular, insurers’ attitudes towards conditional fee 
agreements and their readiness to embark upon satellite litigation to contest 
the ability of claimants’ lawyers to bring claims has had major effects upon 
use of tort law. For example, because of the fee changes those suffering from 
industrial disease are now much less likely to obtain representation, and they 
will find it even more difficult to obtain compensation than they did previous-
ly.99 
43 Although fee arrangements have been sanctioned which clearly take insurance 
into account, in a number of other respects the formal rules of procedure have 
ignored insurance. For example, until they were effectively abolished in 1934, 
juries were used to a greater or lesser extent to determine tort cases, and there 
was a rule of practice at the Bar that a jury was not to be told about the insur-
ance position.100 This rule countered the fear that liability might be imposed 
too readily if laymen were aware that an individual defendant was insured. 
Previously it was said to be difficult to get a fair hearing from a jury especial-
ly in a motor accident case.101 The rule has no part to play today because the 
judge, sitting alone, will be aware from his own experience that insurers are 
likely to be party to the great majority of tort cases that come before him. 
Commenting upon the old rule one judge said:  
“…[T]hose days are long past. Everyone knows that all prudent profes-
sional men carry insurance, and the availability and cost of insurance 
must be a relevant factor ….”102  
44 Another example of where the legal system refuses to acknowledge the pres-
ence of insurance is embedded in the doctrine of subrogation. Standing in its 
client’s shoes, an insurer has a right to defend the claim or bring an action to 
recoup monies it is liable to pay out under a policy. This involvement in liti-
 
99 It is true that there has been a proliferation of disease claims recently, numbers rising 
almost threefold from 73,000 in 2002 to 213,000 in 2004 according to Compensation 
Recovery Unit figures. However, this is the result of the special compensation rules that 
have been devised for miners’ respiratory diseases and vibration white finger. Almost 
740,000 of such claims have been registered since 1999, and are said to be “the biggest 
personal injury schemes in British legal history and possibly the world” according to 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/coalhealth/01.htm. However, the move to conditional fees for 
other disease claims has made solicitors much more reluctant to pursue them as 
acknowledged at recent Association of Personal Injuries Lawyers meetings. For the dif-
ficulties traditionally faced by those suffering from disease see J. Stapleton, Disease and 
the Compensation Debate (1986). 
100 Discussed by Lord Denning in Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Soc Ltd 
[1967] 2 QB 363 at 375. If the rule were breached, the jury could be discharged. Askew v 
Grimmer (1927) 43 TLR 354. 
101 Scrutton LJ in Gowar v Hales [1928] 1 KB 191 at 197. 
102 Lord Griffiths in Smith v Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858. 
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gation via subrogation is accomplished by using not the name of the insurer 
itself, but that of its policyholder alone. As a result the law reports are replete 
with what are fictitious actions, and students are often left with little indica-
tion of the importance of insurance to the civil system.103 The press and public 
are similarly left in ignorance of the insurance background. This cloak of ano-
nymity has only rarely attracted the criticism it merits.104 
45 Procedural problems can be caused by failing to recognise the role of insurers. 
For example, it may be necessary to serve documents directly upon the de-
fendant himself. The insurance company may not suffice.105 In particular, the 
Motor Insurers Bureau, which administers the reserve funds for motor vehicle 
accidents involving uninsured or unidentified drivers, has been able take con-
siderable advantage of the technicalities resulting from the requirements of 
service. To avoid some of the procedural difficulties, sometimes it has been 
necessary to create special rules. For example, even though a defendant com-
pany is no longer in existence it is now possible for it to be restored to the reg-
ister of companies solely in order for it to be sued.106 Its old insurer cannot 
then avoid liability for injuries only because it has been dissolved. However, 
there are difficulties even with this procedure,107 and further problems are still 
caused by the fact that an individual defendant and not an insurer is technical-
ly the party to the action. 
B.  The Duty of Care 
46 The duty concept acts as the gatekeeper of the law of tort insofar as it deter-
mines whether novel claims are to proceed further. Taking into account wider 
policy factors, judges can rule out claims for which there may be no prece-
dent. Policy concerns such as the danger of encouraging a flood of claims and 
placing an excessive burden upon defendants have been most discussed in re-
lation to the duty concept. However, judges have examined less often the sec-
ondary consequence of such a danger – the difficulty of insuring against a 
very wide liability. Stapleton argues that such a factor is distinct from the mo-
rality of imposing an indeterminate liability, and that insurance difficulties 
alone have been of little importance in decision making. This is because, first-
 
103 This includes the ignorant jury who refused to find the named defendant liable because 
“you sued the wrong people. You should have sued the insurance company.” R. Eg-
gleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (2nd edn. 1983), 73. 
104 R. Hasson, Subrogation in Insurance Law – A Critical Evaluation, [1985] 5 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 416. 
105 The position in relation to motor insurance has been improved by the European Com-
munities (Rights Against Insurers) Regulations 2002 (SI No 3061) made pursuant to the 
Fourth Motor Insurance Directive 2000/26/EC. 
106 Companies Act 1989 s 141. 
107 The Law Commission, Third Parties - Rights against Insurers Report No 272 (2001), 
and Lord Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper (2002) 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/rro/tparties.htm. 
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ly, she believes that, where a duty has been found, insurance has only been 
used as a superfluous additional argument for doing so; and secondly, where a 
duty has been denied, insurance tends to be ignored even though it may be 
clear that the defendant could protect himself against the liability. 
47 By contrast, it has been argued that the scope of the duty of care expanded 
directly in relation to the increasing availability of liability insurance from 
1880, and it contracted following insurance fears after 1984.108 In response 
Stapleton states that this causal connection can only be made in a very broad 
sense for, although there were several major fluctuations in liability over the 
century, there was no equivalent ebb and flow of insurance to account for 
them. As an illustration, the case that heralded the judicial retrenchment of the 
1980s may actually have ignored the insurance position.109  This is because 
the decision severely curtailed liability for causing economic loss, even 
though it was probable that liability insurance was actually available to cover 
that loss, or would have been made available if required.110 Such insurance 
exists in other European countries.111 
48 However, there are cases where insurance has been specifically taken into 
account. Distribution of loss arguments have been considered particularly rel-
evant where economic loss has been claimed.112 In one such case, when con-
sidering the general principles to be applied to determine whether a duty of 
care existed, a judge discussed at length how his decision might be affected by 
broad views of the economic consequences.113 Two specific illustrations of 
the effect of insurance in a particular case can be given. In the first, a classifi-
cation surveyor, employed by shipowners, was held to owe no duty of care to 
those having an interest in the cargo.114 In part this was because the court con-
sidered their irrecoverable loss was “readily insurable.” The second case con-
cerned the liability of a surveyor of property engaged by a mortgagor. He was 
held liable for his survey to the purchaser of the property who, although not 
directly commissioning the report, had relied upon it. In preventing the sur-
veyor from disclaiming a duty of care, one judge said that the risk of the sur-
veyor’s negligence would be distributed among all house purchasers through 
an increase in his fees to cover insurance, rather than allowing the whole of 
the risk to fall upon the one unfortunate purchaser.115 These distributional 
consequences can be hard to assess, and reveal the wide scope for potential 
 
108 Davies, [1989] 9 Legal Studies, 67. 
109 Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 378. 
110 Clarke (supra fn. 39), at 277 and 286. 
111 Ibid. Contrast the generally limited provision in European countries described in W. Van 
Boom et al., Pure Economic Loss (2004), especially at 200. 
112 See cases cited in S. Deakin/A. Johnson/B. Markesinis, Tort Law (5th edn. 2003), 144 et 
seq. 
113 Hoffmann J in Morgan Crucible Co v Hill Samuel [1991] Ch 295 at 302.  
114 Marc Rich & Co v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] AC 211 at 241. 
115 Lord Griffiths in Smith v Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 at 859. 
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discussion. Fearful of this, and in order to limit speculation, other judges have 
asked for clear evidence to be presented on matters such as uninsurability.116 
49 Conflicting judicial views about the relevance of insurance can be illustrated 
by reference to two recent cases involving injuries suffered when taking part 
in sport. In the first, insurance was thought relevant to whether a rugby referee 
owed a duty of care to the players in the game over which he had control. The 
court accepted that its decision was affected not only by the availability of li-
ability insurance, but also by the countervailing consideration of the ability of 
the players to take out their own accident insurance.117 A duty of care was 
found. By contrast, in the second case, although again a duty was found, in-
surance was deemed irrelevant. A duty of care towards a boxer was imposed 
on the non-profit making Board that governed boxing, and its insurance and 
financial difficulties that might result were ignored.118  
50 Where, as in most cases, insurance is not discussed, a few tort commentators 
still speculate whether it might help to explain a court decision. For example, 
it has been held that an ambulance service owes a duty of care to those it has 
been called to attend.119 However, the fire service owes no such duty in re-
sponding to its emergency calls.120 One textbook comments: 
 “If there is to be a difference between the cases, it seems better to realise 
that it lies in the fact that the fire service is primarily concerned with sav-
ing property and that imposing liability would tend to enure for the bene-
fit of subrogated fire insurers who have taken a premium to cover the risk 
….”121 
51 By contrast, the person who suffered brain damage as a result of the failure of 
the ambulance to arrive was unlikely to carry first party insurance against 
such an injury. It is impossible to disprove the view that insurance may have 
had an effect upon these decisions, but it can be hazardous to make other than 
a speculative connection as the above textbook writer did. Such connections 
are not far-fetched; but in the individual case they remain unproven. 
 
116 Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Ll Rep 255 at 277, and the dissent of Lord Lloyd in Marc 
Rich & Co v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] AC 211. 
117 Vowles v Evans [2003] 1 WLR 1607, Van Oppen v Clerk to the Bedford Charity Trus-
tees [1990] 1 WLR 235. 
118 Watson v British Boxing Board of Control [2001] QB 1134 at 1163. 
119 Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36. 
120 Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] QB 1004. 
121 W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16th edn. 2002), 143. This echoes the 
view of Lord Hoffmann in Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 at 954. 
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C.  Fault, Strict Liability and the Standard of Care (Question 11) 
52 The standard of care has been said to be affected by insurance because judges 
have a wide discretion to interpret what may be expected of the reasonable 
man. They can demand a very high level of care and, in effect, impose strict 
liability through the fiction of fault. The standard of care can be made more 
objective by being divorced from the particular circumstances, and excuses, of 
the defendant. We have already cited the example of the learner driver held to 
the standard of care of a fully qualified driver, and the reasonable man at 
times has been said to require “agility of an acrobat and the foresight of a He-
brew prophet.” 
53 Although it is tempting to assert that it is insurance that accounts for these 
high standards, other explanations are possible. For example, one judge re-
cently acknowledged that the great care required of motorists merely reflected 
the fact that the car is a very dangerous weapon and the pedestrian very vul-
nerable.122 Moreover, it is clear that the scope of liability does not correspond 
to the extent of potential protection provided by insurance. Firstly, as a mod-
ern example we might note that the standard of care required of doctors has 
not been stretched to exceptional levels in spite of the availability of insur-
ance. Secondly, it must be remembered that in the nineteenth century defend-
ants were held liable for extensive damage long before liability insurance be-
came readily available from around 1880.123 The formal rules of tort then of-
fered considerable scope for the imposition of strict liability long before there 
were ideas that this might be economically efficient or that losses might be 
channelled into deeper pockets. Although the liability insurance market be-
came well established in the early part of the twentieth century, it was the 
fault principle, rather than strict liability, that came to dominate the formal 
law. The loss spreading and insurance rationales of strict liability were largely 
abandoned by the common law after a landmark case in 1946, which saw the 
triumph of fault.124 Thereafter strict liability could usually only be found 
where courts labelled as fault those acts which were far from being so in reali-
ty. Although statute has imposed some strict liability, it is limited and, apart 
from in work accident cases, and for some aspects of economic loss,125 it has 
had little practical effect. Insurance therefore has had very limited effect in 
encouraging the development of rules of strict liability. 
 
122 Russell v Smith [2003] EWHC 2060 and Eagle v Chambers [2004] RTR 9. 
123 Its roots can be traced back to the early nineteenth century and marine insurance. How-
ever, the major stimulus was provided later in the century as a result of engineering risks 
and employers’ liability. Ch. Parsons, From Accident to Liability - A Brief History of 
Liability Insurance, [2002] 17 (2) Insurance Research & Practice, 23, W.A. Dinsdale, A 
History of Accident Insurance in Great Britain (1954). 
124 Read v Lyons & Co Ltd [1947] AC 146. 
125 K.M. Stanton, The Modern Law of Tort (1994), chap. 17. 
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54 The fault principle continues to thrive in spite of the growth of insurance. A 
claim will fail unless fault is proven no matter how much insurance the de-
fendant carries. For example, no damages are payable as a result of an acci-
dent in which the driver dies of a heart attack before the collision occurs, or 
where the driver is suddenly affected by an illness of which he had no prior 
knowledge.126 Not only will there be no liability in tort, but there can be no 
claim on any reserve fund. Strict liability has been imposed for many work 
accidents where statute prescribes the standard of care required. However, it is 
still possible for a defendant to avoid liability by arguing that the statute re-
quires proof of fault, or that its breach was not the cause of the injury to the 
claimant. A couple of very recent cases illustrate this. The failure to provide a 
safe working platform was held not to be the cause of injury when a claimant 
fell from an unsafe platform as a result of it being deliberately toppled in an-
ger by a workmate.127 Similarly, even though an employer supplied safety 
boots that contained a hole and caused the claimant to suffer frostbite, there 
was no liability because this was not a risk against which the steel-capped 
boots were intended to guard.128 Although insurance undoubtedly influenced 
the imposition of strict liability upon employers in the first place, it is but part 
of a complex mixture of factors determining whether damages will be paid. In 
many cases the morality behind the fault principle, or the notion of responsi-
bility, has sufficient strength to override the fact that the defendant is insured. 
Insurance has brought about no sea change in the formal basis of liability and 
its influence is partial at best.    
D.  Causation 
55 Although drawing a line to liability based on causation is open to wide rang-
ing influences, cases that specifically refer to insurance are few indeed. Even 
in a major recent case dealing with injury by asbestos where the amounts of 
compensation at stake were exceptional and policy issues to the fore, insur-
ance was not mentioned.129 This has not prevented commentators from sug-
gesting that the hidden hand of insurance might explain the very generous 
view of causation taken in a number of personal injury cases where liability 
has been imposed for freak accidents or bizarre results.130 However, again the 
influence of insurance is inconsistent for it is possible to point to cases that 
have adopted a less generous approach. Some claimants have been denied de-
 
126 Mansfield v Weetabix [1998] 1 WLR 1263 
127 Horton v Taplin Contracts [2003] PIQR P12. 
128 Fytche v Wincanton Logistics [2004] UKHL 31. 
129 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] AC 32 noted by K. Oliphant in: H. 
Koziol/B.C. Steininger (eds.), European Tort Law 2002 (2003), 144. J. Morgan, Lost 
Causes in the House of Lords, [2003] 66 Modern Law Review, 227 at 282 notes that the 
sums involved in this case were “staggeringly large” and cites a press release from the 
construction union UCATT headlined “insurance companies hit for £6 - £8 billion.” 
130 Cane (supra fn. 2), 106. 
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spite their need of compensation, and even though the defendant was not only 
at fault but also insured. 
56 Insurance has been said to be a factor in certain cases where the causation 
rules have been applied in a restricted way to provide for only a very limited 
liability in relation to property damage.131 Claimants are much more likely to 
carry first party insurance for such damage than they are to be insured against 
personal injury. Lord Hoffmann recently stated: 
“Property insurance is relatively cheap and accessible; in my opinion 
people should be encouraged to insure their own property rather than seek 
to transfer the risk to others by means of litigation, with the heavy trans-
actional costs which that involves.”132 
57 However, in the same case Lord Hobhouse denied that insurance should affect 
principles of liability: 
“The argument that insurance makes the rule unnecessary is no more val-
id than saying that, because some people can afford to and sensibly do 
take out comprehensive car insurance, no driver should be civilly liable 
for his negligent driving.” 
58 In an earlier case, Lord Denning, following the Hoffmann reasoning, explicit-
ly argued that no liability should be imposed, and there should be a break in 
the chain of causation, partly because the claimant could have relied on first 
party insurance against property damage.133 In fact, the judge may have been 
wrong in this for the property had been empty for some time and, as a result, 
no insurance may have been in force.134 The case may illustrate that when 
courts try to take wider factors into account they may find the position more 
complex than at first appears. They may lack the technical evidence required, 
and their speculation about the insurance position may prove quite wrong.135  
 
131 For example, the limited liability imposed for damage caused by fire in the USA. J.G. 
Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts (2nd edn. 1985), 15, W. L. Prosser, Law of 
Torts (4th edn. 1971), 553. 
132 Transco v Stockport Metropolitan Council [2003] 3 WLR 1467. Similarly Lord Diplock 
in Photo Productions v Securicor Ltd [1980] AC 827 at 85, and contrast Lord Denning 
in the lower court who considered that a plaintiff’s loss insurance could be cancelled out 
by a defendant’s liability insurance [1978] 1 WLR 856 at 866. 
133 Lamb v Camden LBC [1981] QB 625. 
134 B. Lee/R. Merkin, Human Action as Novus Actus Interveniens, [1981] New Law Jour-
nal, 965. 
135 Clarke (supra fn. 39), 292 notes that information on insurance may be hard to obtain, and 
argues that the reasons for putting a ceiling on the liability of carriers, for example, do 
not bear close scrutiny. 
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E.  Defences 
59 It is possible to view certain cases in which courts have refused to apply de-
fences which would deprive the claimant of all or part of the damages as be-
ing influenced by the insurance position. For example, the ability to pay is 
said to account for cases in which the tiredness of a worker which helps to 
cause his own injury is held not to constitute contributory negligence, and his 
damages are not then reduced. By contrast, the tiredness which results in inju-
ry to another worker, and for which the employer could be vicariously liable, 
is held to be negligence. (Question 11)  
60 However, courts never refer to insurance specifically in this context, and the 
argument again depends on cases being determined by hidden factors, and ac-
cepting that its effect on the law, at best, is partial. On the one hand, insurance 
may have influenced both judges and Parliament in that they have restricted 
the scope of the defence of consent in areas where insurance is compulsory. 
For example, in motor accidents a statute prevents a passenger’s claim from 
being defeated by any express or implied agreement he may have made with 
the driver.136 This means that his claim cannot be defeated by a notice in the 
vehicle disclaiming any liability. Similarly for work accidents, judges have 
determined that where an employer is in breach of his statutory duty the claim 
against him cannot be avoided by pleading that the worker consented to the 
state of affairs. On the other hand, however, it must be emphasised that con-
tributory negligence continues to be applied frequently in personal injury 
claims, reducing damages in about a quarter of all cases that are settled.137 In a 
recent case damages were reduced by as much as 60 per cent in spite of the 
defendant being in breach of statutory duty.138 Furthermore, even the defence 
of consent survives in a handful of cases to defeat a claim from those who are 
extremely foolhardy, such as the passenger who chose to take a joyride in a 
plane, rather than a car, with a pilot with whom he had consumed a great deal 
of alcohol.139 The morality of the fault principle is hard to eradicate in such a 
case, no matter what the level of insurance. 
61 In one case, although consent failed as a defence involving a claim for occu-
pier’s liability, warning notices displayed at the behest of the liability insurer 
were held to be effective to deny a duty of care to a spectator at a motor 
race.140 The case is especially notable for the dissent of Lord Denning who, 
because of the insurance factor, would have allowed damages. He thought that 
the insurer’s warning notices should have been ineffective because insurers 
should not be allowed to take the premiums and yet avoid the liability. How-
 
136 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 149. 
137 D. Harris et al. (supra fn. 19), 91. 
138 Sherlock v Chester City Council [2004] EWCA Civ 201.  
139 Morris v Murray [1991] 2 QB 6. 
140 White v Blackmore [1972] 2 QB 651 at 667. 
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ever, the other judges did not share his analysis. A statute was later passed 
which today may enable such a claim to succeed. It prevents an occupier of 
business premises from excluding liability for death or personal injury to visi-
tors. However, an exclusion relating to property damage is allowed if it is rea-
sonable. One of the factors affecting this, and specified in the statute, is the 
availability of insurance.141 (Question 22)  
F.  Vicarious Liability 
62 The principle of vicarious liability holds an employer strictly liable for the 
torts of an employee acting in the course of his employment. This has been 
justified on the basis that it enables losses to be borne by those with deeper 
pockets, and that employers are better placed to make insurance provision.142 
Although these justifications may help account for some aspects of the liabil-
ity, again they will not suffice to justify the full scope of the rule. For exam-
ple, there is usually no vicarious liability for the acts of independent contrac-
tors even though the needs of the claimant and the ability of the employer to 
insure may be the same. Nor is there liability if the employee acts outside the 
course of his employment. Even where recent decisions appear to impose a 
stricter liability, judges do not refer to insurance as a factor.143 It cannot be as-
serted that there is a direct correlation between the availability of insurance 
and the imposition of vicarious liability when the basic rule is subject to such 
major exceptions for which insurance cannot account. Stapleton stresses this 
point, and argues that the wide approval of the vicarious liability limits un-
dermines the relevance of insurability as a factor in tort law.144 However, alt-
hough it cannot be viewed as a sole factor, insurance cannot be discounted as 
an influence upon the expansion in liability.   
63 In a vicarious liability case in 1957 a court notably refused to take insurance 
into account and this led to measures being taken to avoid its result.145 The in-
surer of the employer found vicariously liable successfully reclaimed the 
damages for which it was responsible from the negligent employee who had 
caused the accident. Although the action was brought via subrogation in the 
name of the employer, it was pursued against the employer’s wishes. Employ-
ers generally were opposed to such recovery by insurers. Together with trade 
unions, they considered that it would be bad for industrial relations if respon-
sibility for shop-floor accidents were to be transferred to uninsured employees 
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in this way. As a result, after the case they came to a private agreement with 
insurers’ representatives that subrogation would not be used in this way again. 
The full effects of the fault system were therefore abandoned in practice. Alt-
hough this was achieved without judicial assistance, the result is that it is in-
surers, and never employees, who pay the tort bill.   
G.  Assessment of Damages (Questions 18 to 20) 
64 Contrary to the impression that may be gained from a tort textbook, it is quan-
tum rather than liability that is the more important issue for a practitioner. In-
surers are far more likely to contest the amount of damages claimed rather 
than whether there has been a breach of duty. Arguments that the defendant 
did not cause the injury or owed no duty of care are rare indeed. Too little at-
tention has been paid by academics to the damages award. It should be a focus 
of concern not only when the efficacy of the tort system as a whole is being 
discussed, but also when the justice of any tort rule is being scrutinised. The 
debate about the influence of insurance upon tort similarly reflects too little 
concern about the damages award. 
65 It is clear that, at least in cases of serious personal injury, “the size of damages 
awards … is explicable only on the basis that judges are influenced by the 
widespread presence of insurance.”146 This is a major point. The extraordi-
narily high level of damages all paid in one lump sum is the feature of the tort 
system that distinguishes it from welfare and other compensation systems. Li-
ability insurance enables tort to espouse its distinctive rhetoric: it purports to 
make an assessment of loss that is not only tailored to the individual claimant, 
but sufficient to restore the position before injury took place. These claims are 
greatly overstated,147 and yet form much of the reason for tort’s existence. 
Without a mechanism to distribute the cost of imposing liability, it would 
rarely be worth assessing damages in the way we do at present in serious inju-
ry claims. Without insurance it is doubtful whether the tort system would sur-
vive at all. Insurance in this sense provides the lifeblood of tort. 
66 In recent years major changes have been made to the assessment of damages, 
and many of these are predicated upon payment being made either by insur-
ers, or other large self-insured bodies. The assessment of damages has become 
ever more precise. Actuarial and forensic accountancy evidence has become 
commonplace. Such matters as the discount rate for early receipt of damages, 
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the interest rate on delayed payment, and the inflation factor enabling past 
awards to be compared with those of the present day have all been more 
closely linked to the wider financial world. In a few serious injury cases lump 
sum payment has been replaced in part by a periodic pension, and the courts 
now have the power to order that damages take this form even if the parties 
object.148 It is impossible to conceive of such developments - involving con-
tinuing lifetime obligations to make increasing payments - if it were not for 
the fact that individuals almost never pay tort damages themselves. The argu-
ment here is that it is not easy to divorce these changing rules on assessment 
and payment of damages from the fact that it is insurers who run the tort sys-
tem. 
67 A previous ECTIL report examined in detail the extent that damages take 
account of the actual receipt of insurance monies, whether deriving from pri-
vate or public sources.149 That report noted that there is a trend in the UK to-
wards preventing claimants obtaining double compensation by reducing dam-
ages to take account of these collateral benefits. Thus a series of cases in re-
cent years have deducted various types of social security benefit. In one of 
these cases a judge recognised the reality that damages are met from insurance 
premiums, and to allow a claimant to recover twice, at the expense of insurers, 
could not be justified.150 Following the institution of statutory scheme in 1990, 
social security benefits are now recovered by the state from damages awards. 
Insurers are required to deduct benefits from any tort compensation they pay, 
and reimburse the state. However, no account is taken of any private insur-
ance from which the claimant benefits151 unless it relates to a policy paid for 
by his employer alone.152 It is therefore still common for over-compensation 
to take place. For example, in two thirds of the cases where negligence causes 
death, the estate benefits from receipt of life insurance monies in addition to 
tort damages.153 Private insurance is therefore usually ignored by the tort sys-
tem, whereas public insurance is now almost always deducted from damages, 
and this has reduced the incentive to sue in tort. 
68 Apart from this example, the extent that insurance influences damages in 
particular cases, as opposed to the system in general, is much less clear. In the 
USA individual damages awards have clearly been affected by insurance poli-
cy limits. There is evidence that lawyers do not pursue claims beyond these 
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limits in order to obtain “blood money” from defendants personally.154 How-
ever, in the UK the policy limits for a claim are almost never relevant, and 
therefore it is less easy to see the precise effect of insurance cover. As in other 
areas, judges have expressed different views concerning the relevance of in-
surance and this results in much uncertainty. Their diversity of approach can 
be illustrated by three leading appellate cases. Although they all mention in-
surance, in only one of them was there any detailed discussion of the wider ef-
fects on society of substantially increasing damages, and in the first of them 
the relevance of insurance was emphatically denied. 
69 In this first case damages were sought for the care freely given by a spouse to 
his loved one following her serious injury.155 It was established law that such 
a claim could be made even though the husband did not charge his wife for 
the help he gave her. However, the complicating factor was that the wife’s in-
jury had been caused by the husband’s own negligence. He was thus both tort-
feasor and carer. The court held that his wife could not succeed in her claim 
for the cost of care that he had freely given. A tortfeasor could not be ex-
pected to pay twice for the injury by not only giving the care, but then also 
having to pay for it. The claimant had argued that this ignored the reality that 
it was the husband’s insurer that would pay, not the husband himself. Howev-
er, the House of Lords strongly rejected the relevance of insurance, and this 
was later supported by the Law Commission for the “danger otherwise is that 
decisions as to where liabilities should be imposed will be made on the basis 
of who happens to be insured.”156     
70 In the second of the cases, the court again took a conservative line with regard 
to the relevance of insurance when it substantially increased compensation to 
allow more precisely for the return on investment of a lump sum award of 
damages. Actuarial evidence showed that previously claimants had been un-
der-compensated because they had been expected to obtain an unrealistic rate 
of interest. To pay for the increase in damages the court recognised that insur-
ance premiums would have to rise. “Whether this was something which the 
country can afford is not a subject on which your Lordships were addressed. 
So we are not in a position to form any view as to the wider consequences.”157 
Any change to the rule that the defendant had to pay damages in full could on-
ly be made by Parliament “which, unlike the judges, is in a position to balance 
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the many social, financial and economic factors which would have to be con-
sidered….”158   
71 By contrast, in the final case, evidence of the wider consequences of raising 
damages for non-pecuniary loss was presented to the court, and had consider-
able effect upon the outcome.159 (Question 20) Although involving questions 
of social policy, the level of damages was not thought a matter for Parliament 
alone. However, the court drew a distinction between its role in a claim for 
pecuniary as opposed to non-pecuniary loss: for pecuniary loss, the court was 
only required to make the correct calculation, and economic consequences 
were irrelevant; whereas for non-pecuniary loss, the court was concerned with 
what was fair, just and reasonable, and the impact upon society was then a 
relevant factor. The court was to avoid setting damages “at a level which 
would materially affect the cost of living or disturb the current social pat-
tern….”160 As a result it was important to consider how the insurance industry 
might be affected by any change. In addition, the consequences for the Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) in paying for the effects of clinical negligence 
had to be considered. Various parties submitted written evidence to the court 
giving details of the effect on insurance premiums of a change in the way 
damages are assessed. They also dealt with the consequences for the NHS if 
its resources were to be depleted by increasing awards of compensation. Alt-
hough these matters were discussed in general terms in the judgement itself, 
there was no examination of the detailed calculations. Nevertheless a decision 
was reached which was broadly favourable to defendants: although damages 
for pain and suffering were increased by up to a third in the most serious inju-
ry cases, no increase was made for the mass of claims involving minor injury. 
Compared to the Law Commission’s proposal for a substantial increase in 
damages for a much broader range of cases, this change caused insurers little 
difficulty. The Commission had attached much less importance than the court 
to the wider consequences for society and had not considered cost to be rele-
vant. Although the court tried to confine these wider ranging arguments to 
non-pecuniary loss cases, it was directly influenced by the impact of any 
change in assessment upon insurance. 
72 Wider ranging factors which might influence damages for personal injury 
were also discussed in a case which considered whether such awards must be 
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considered as comparitors when damages for defamation are assessed.161 In 
deciding that comparison need not always be made, Lord Hoffmann noted that 
damages for personal injury, unlike those for defamation, are almost always 
paid either by insurers or out of public funds and, as he stated elsewhere, 
“spread across the whole community by an intricate series of economic 
links.”162 Their exemplary and deterrent effects are minimal or non-existent. 
The total sums paid out by the personal injury system are very large and have 
an effect upon the economy as a whole. As a result, he argued, the amounts 
awarded depend to some extent upon what society can afford to pay the vic-
tim. By contrast, these considerations have little part to play when damages 
for defamation are assessed. 
H.  Punitive damages 
73 Insurance has had little effect upon the award of punitive damages in the UK. 
(Question 19) The bases for such an award are extremely limited and in prac-
tice they affect areas where private insurance has little role to play, such as 
claims against government bodies. By far the most important area where in-
surance is taken out relates to the liability of police authorities. However, the 
amount of damages awarded against such body, given that it is publicly fund-
ed, is unlikely to be affected by whether or not there is insurance as well.  
74 In one case an insurer contested whether it had a duty to pay punitive damages 
under the terms of its standard liability policy.163 However, the court held that 
the wording did cover punitive damages, and that there was no rule of public 
policy to rule out such cover at least in respect of a police authority’s vicari-
ous liability. The Law Commission has recommended that punitive damages 
be extended.164 It also considered whether defendants should be allowed to in-
sure against the possibility of such damages being awarded, and concluded 
that there should be no restriction. However, police authorities have reported 
that it is now difficult to arrange such cover.165 
V. Insurance and Statute 
A.  Insurers’ Lobbying and Influence upon Legislation 
75 A wide range of legislation going far beyond liability concerns can affect 
insurers. They formed their own trade association in 1917 partly in order to 
respond to potential changes in the law. The Association of British Insurers 
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(ABI) has since grown to such an extent that, with one exception, it is now 
more than twice the size of any other trade association.166 With an annual 
budget of over £20 million, it has been very effective in putting forward the 
industry’s point of view. The regulatory framework of insurance reflects the 
success of the ABI in arguing for forms of self-regulation in lieu of statutory 
controls, and for exemption from general legislation that might otherwise ap-
ply. Insurance remains the least regulated of contracts, and its exemption from 
domestic legislation dealing with unfair contract terms “amazing.”167 
76 One forthright example of the ABI pressing its case is where it issued a press 
release just before an appellate hearing was due to take place. In the release it 
threatened insurers’ withdrawal from a particular market in the event of the 
court finding liability.168 More effective has been its regular lobbying of gov-
ernment ministries. One insurance commentator has even suggested that in-
ternationally institutions such as the ABI “see themselves as governing gov-
ernments.”169 In addition to lobbying ministries, the ABI has ensured that its 
case is heard in Parliament. Until 1997 one in ten Members of Parliament de-
clared a financial link with the insurance industry,170 although this figure has 
been halved for the current Parliament.171 
77 The ABI is organised so as to respond to all government proposals to change 
the wide areas of law with which it is concerned. In 1998 the government an-
nounced that no proposal for regulation which has an impact upon businesses 
would be considered by ministers without a “regulatory impact assessment” 
being carried out. Rather than being just another bureaucratic requirement, the 
new procedures offer business and industry a major opportunity to influence 
the policy and legislative process.172 Parliamentary Bills are now accompa-
nied by impact statements assessing the financial costs and benefits of the 
measures being proposed. In drawing up such statements civil servants are di-
rected to consult widely. Twenty or so bodies are specifically named, one of 
them being the ABI.173 As a result, it is automatic for the ABI to be asked to 
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estimate the effect of proposed reforms on insurance premiums. Insurability is 
therefore now a relevant consideration whenever statutory changes affecting 
tort are being considered. (Question 5) Impact statements have given insurers 
a more formal and public opportunity to make representations to government, 
but it is doubtful whether this has given them much more influence than they 
had previously. This is because their most effective representations continue 
to be exercised in private, behind closed doors.174  
78 One illustration of the effectiveness of such private lobbying is the overturn-
ing of a Law Commission recommendation that a particular financial formula 
be used to set the discount rate in assessing damages. (This rate makes allow-
ance for the investment return upon lump sum damages). In the Damages Act 
1996 the Commission’s recommendation was replaced by a power given to 
the Lord Chancellor to change the rate as he saw fit. However, this discretion-
ary power was not exercised for some time, and when a rate was eventually 
set it was less favourable to claimants than if the Commission’s formula had 
been used. The Opposition spokesman in Parliament noted that the change in 
the Act was “mightily convenient to the insurance industry” and commented 
that it was the result of “whispering in appropriate ears.”175 The effectiveness 
of this private lobbying is difficult to monitor, and has received only limited 
attention from public lawyers. It reveals “a hidden dimension of the law 
which many lawyers may prefer to leave decently covered.”176 
B.  The Influence of Insurance upon Particular Tort Statutes 
79 Statute has been affected not only by the lobbying of insurers on specific 
matters, but also, in a more general way, by developments in insurance provi-
sion. As with caselaw, it can be argued that new legislative rules reflect the 
tort system’s ability to distribute the cost of injury via insurance. The influ-
ence has been said to be clearer in relation to statute than caselaw.177 Howev-
er, others might argue that among the relatively few statutes that deal directly 
with tort, there are examples of legislation, such as that dealing with occupiers 
liability, which take little notice of the incidence or potential scope of liability 
insurance. 
80 By contrast, certain legislative measures can only be explained by reference to 
the insurance background. For example, one statute exempts from liability any 
mother causing injury to her unborn child. However, it is subject to an excep-
tion where the injury results from the mother’s negligent driving of a motor 
vehicle, and the mother then can be sued.178 Although this Act generally re-
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flects a desire to prevent disputes among family members, its effect is limited 
in that one area where insurance against liability is compulsory. Similarly the 
reform which abolished the rule which prevented actions between husbands 
and wives has been explained by the need to access insurance funds where a 
road accident had occurred.179 (Question 21) Under that legislation a stay of 
action may be ordered by a court where no substantial benefit would accrue to 
either husband or wife, the intention being that this power would be exercised 
in situations where no insurance existed. The spread of insurance provision is 
also said to account for a series of statutes which have expanded the scope of 
liability such as those enabling actions to be brought against the estates of de-
ceased tortfeasors, 180 dissolved companies,181 or by claimants who are partly 
at fault themselves.182 One statute familiar to all tort students explicitly takes 
insurance into account for it declares that, in determining whether a notice is 
sufficient to exclude liability, the court must have regard to the availability of 
insurance.183 
VI. Liability Insurance Crises (Question 7) 
81 On several occasions in the past liability insurance has been said to be in cri-
sis. Symptoms have included the failure of liability companies, or their with-
drawal from particular markets. More commonly it has been a very steep rise 
in the cost of insurance that has signified that all is not well. If insurers in-
crease premiums to a very high level more motorists and employers will fail 
to comply with their duty to insure. A rise in premiums may also deter activi-
ties that the community at large needs, or result in costs which the community 
can ill afford. However, the extent to which these crises have been precipitat-
ed by changes in tort rules themselves is a matter of controversy. Here it will 
be argued that it has been other factors that have been much more important. 
Even though the crises have been used to justify sharp increases in premiums, 
the cost of liability insurance remains very small for the great majority of 
businesses. For example, the average cost of employers’ liability insurance is 
only 0.25 per cent of the payroll.184 
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82 The most recent crisis illustrates that changes in tort law, although giving 
cause for concern, do not have as much effect upon insurance rates as insurers 
and others would have us believe.185 In 2002, after premiums had fallen by 14 
per cent in the previous five years, they rose dramatically. There were in-
creases of 50 per cent for employers liability, 30 to 40 per cent for public lia-
bility and 30 to 60 per cent for professional indemnity insurance. The amount 
which policyholders had to bear themselves before insurance monies could be 
claimed also rose sharply. These changes resulted in some larger organisa-
tions deserting the market and setting up their own captive insurance compa-
nies.186 Other alleged effects of the rate increase were more controversial. 
Although there was anecdotal evidence that many firms had been forced to 
trade illegally, in fact compliance remained high with only 1 in 200 employers 
in default.187 Similarly, although there had been estimates that up to 200,000 
small firms were unable to find insurance at all, a report into the crisis from 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) could find little evidence that in fact this was 
the case. Insurance continued to be available, although sometimes only at a 
high price.188 For example, for the high risks involved in roofing work it was 
estimated that premiums rose by an average of 161 per cent. Firms most af-
fected were not only those taking high risks, but also smaller firms where the 
premium rise was likely to account for a higher percentage of their turnover. 
Independent financial advisers also found that their rates had soared following 
a wave of scandals that had engulfed the industry. The regulator closed down 
several operators not having insurance cover. The effect of the rate rise thus 
differed according to the size and character of the business. However, overall 
the crisis was not as serious as some had suggested, and the average firm was 
able to absorb the increased premiums without too much trouble. 
83 To what extent had changes in the law of tort contributed to the rise in rates? 
Previously Cane had attributed the steep increase in the rates set in the 1980s 
 
185 See F. Furedi, Courting Mistrust: The Hidden Growth of a Culture of Litigation in Brit-
ain (1999), and contrast E. Lee et al., Compensation Crazy: Do We Blame and Claim 
Too Much? (2002) and the Better Regulation Task Force, Better Routes to Redress 
(2004). The latter, a Government report, concludes that the compensation culture may be 
a myth, but the perception of it results in real and costly burdens. For an account of ex-
aggerated tort claims by the media in the USA see W. Haltom/M. McCann, Distorting 
the Law: Politics, Media, and the Litigation Crisis (2004). 
186 In the two years from 2001 the number increased from 245 to 492. The Times 27 May 
2003.  
187 Department of Work and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Compulsory Insur-
ance: Second Stage Report (2003), 21. About 112,000 workers were employed where 
there was no liability insurance. 
188 Office of Fair Trading, An Analysis of Current Problems in the UK Liability Insurance 
Market (2003). However, there are fears that there will shortly be no cover for asbestos 
liability. From July 2003 the world’s largest reinsurers, Munich Re, Swiss Re and Co-
logne Re, announced that they would no longer underwrite this liability. If the reinsur-
ance market disappears, companies with workplace asbestos exposure will not be able to 
obtain cover and many businesses would have to cease trading. The Times 3 June 2003. 
England and Wales 41 
for many professional groups to the dynamics of the insurance industry rather 
than to changes in tort liability.189 A similar conclusion may be reached in re-
lation to the increases made in 2002. According to the OFT report, although 
changes in the tort system account for part of the increase in the premiums, 
the main causes lie outside of that system. 
84 The most important tort factor is not an increase in the number of claims, but 
an increase in the level of damages and other costs per claim. For example, for 
employers’ liability, although the number of claims are falling, the cost of 
each one is rising sharply.190 Insurers have suggested that the most important 
factor causing this rise is not the changing law, but the specialisation of 
claimants’ lawyers and their access to better information on comparable 
awards.191 Claim cost per motor policy rose by an average of almost 10 per 
cent a year from 1991 to 2000 whereas average earnings rose by only 4.2 per 
cent.192 More tentatively, the OFT report suggests that reforms in civil proce-
dure and the funding of claims may also have encouraged more actions. Final-
ly, and with even more circumspection, increasing liability for “long tail” 
claims, including asbestos, is mentioned. However, the report notes that insur-
ers have a tendency to exaggerate the effect of changes in tort law as the caus-
es of rises in insurance costs.  
85 By contrast, non-tort factors appear to be far more important. These include 
the uncertainty prevalent in the general insurance climate after the shock of 
the loss of the World Trade Centre; lower investment returns resulting from 
the continued decline of the stock market; the cyclical nature of the insurance 
market; and the structure of the insurance industry which, in the previous five 
years, has resulted in competition at a level which was unsustainable and 
which ignored the commercial realities. Overall, therefore, although tort 
claims costs and liability premiums have increased in recent years, it is diffi-
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cult to conclude that they have led to the system being stretched beyond its 
capacity or that they are the main cause of any “crisis”.193 (Question 7) 
VII. Conclusion 
86 This report has argued that insurance in England and Wales has had a pro-
found effect upon tort and in particular upon the system of personal injury lit-
igation. The influence of insurers upon the everyday practical operation of 
that system is readily apparent. In addition, they clearly have opportunity and 
regularly seek to influence the development of legislation affecting liability. 
Much more difficult to assess is the potential for insurance to affect the out-
come of individual claims. Proving that the facts of cases have been moulded 
to fit the deeper pocket of insurers cannot be done by resort to the law reports 
alone, but it remains the suspicion of many a practitioner. Although it is easier 
to assess the influence of insurance upon the rules of tort, rather than the facts 
found in individual cases, the picture is by no means clear. On the one hand 
certain rules, such as those discussed in the statute section above, clearly re-
flect the distributional consequences of insurance. In addition, if the focus 
changes from establishing liability to assessing damages the general influence 
may be more apparent. On the other hand, there remain large areas of tort law 
where the rules appear unaffected by insurance. The conclusion reached earli-
er in this report was that, at best, the influence of insurance upon the common 
law rules is only partial. Instead, it is with regard to the system as a 
whole - whether involving statutory or common law rules, fact finding, or 
everyday operation - that insurance can be seen as of vital importance. It is the 
lifeblood of the system. 
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